J.P. Morgan -- Nearing climax ....

Writes a list member: "You lost me a few posts ago. I lost track of all those abbreviations and what was going on in the story. Also what does it have to do with China?"

It would perhaps not be amiss to mention at this point in passing that if you buy the print edition, a glossary is included at no additional cost, as well as a succinct exposition of the China connection.

Put yourself in the shoes of the BCL team people. If a document criticizing your work in such terms were sent to you, c.c. your direct client (Morgan VP Becker) as well as other managers, how would you respond?

Say my criticisms were loony. Would you not be inclined to draw attention to the fact? To in some way rebut the specific criticisms? Especially if you'd previously been so vociferous in demanding that I justify my statements? (In an email typical of the stream of adjurations raining upon me when the issue had first flared the previous November, Bill Green had written: "I'd love to know WHY you do not recommend BCL and/or PFC. So would a few other folks who have read your [forum posts]. And, at this point, I'm willing to take it further that you are attaching a negative connotation to the libraries at JP Morgan, and I feel are not acting in a manner supportive of the JP Morgan technology.")

In fact, this was the response I now received, upon sending the BCL team the specific criticisms they'd hungered for for so long:

From: William Green
06/23/98 12:59 PM
To: Uriel Wittenberg
cc: Steve Katz, Robert Zolkiewicz, Marc O Becker, Millard Brown
Subject: Re: FW: Re: EB4PFC

Uriel,

We will not respond to specific criticisms, rather we will wait until the complete "Gap-Analysis" is delivered. My team does not have the time to respond to individual criticisms.

This is not intended to be an evaluation of BCL or EBPFC, but an Analysis of where the libraries differ from an ideal library.

Please make sure your focus is on this gap,

thanks,
Bill Green

It would be more convenient, in other words, to respond to the criticisms after my departure from Morgan, a couple of weeks hence. And that, apparently, was OK with Morgan VP Becker.

In one of his public harangues the previous November, Bill had written:

23 projects are using the BCL or EBPFC and the commentary on it's usage has most certainly not indicated increased time and effort. I want to be very clear as to why you recommend against a Bank Strategy (Reuse and the Use of Libraries is a Bank Strategy).

We have 23 projects in either production or close to production (3 are close to production) and have enjoyed success with these applications, even with those staffed with mostly beginner developers. There is a learning curve, to be sure, but for the most part, we were able to help them be successful.

The firm is comitted to reuse as a strategy with several libraries in use. The PowerBuilder library has been one of the more successful at the bank, and is still a "buy" technology internally. ALL PowerBuilder project teams are urged to look very closely at whether they should use the library or not. If not, we STRONGLY urge that they use a library, possibly the PFC. In my opinion, after being here for 3.5 years, is that MOST PowerBuilder applications use a library, and about half use the official Bank library (BCL or EBPFC).

It was a successful product. It helped developers. But they didn't have any time to spare now -- nor anytime in the next two weeks, as it turned out -- to reconcile that position with my explanation of how the product caused "a very substantial drag on development, grossly increasing the complexity and tediousness of programming any system."

This reminds me of a recent New York Times editorial about Enron executive Sherron Watkins' testimony before a congressional investigating committee:

When asked to describe her reaction to former Enron C.E.O. Jeffrey Skilling's testimony, during which he professed no knowledge of accounting improprieties during his watch, Ms. Watkins aptly quoted advice Mr. Skilling had once shared with employees in a newsletter: "If it doesn't make any sense, don't believe it."

["Not Quite a Whistle-Blower," February 15, 2002]

Chewing on Bill Green's response, I thought: Something very cynical and corrupt is going on here.

It would be necessary to express myself. Somehow; somewhere; somewhen.

There is a principle to be understood here. If you encounter fairly widespread malpractice in any kind of organization and are interested in doing something not guaranteed to be totally irrelevant, it is really a little bit too innocent to discreetly convey your concerns to some leader within the organization. Don't you think he already knows?

Guilty leaders love it when underlings go through "proper channels" like this.

A news report says of the sweet Ms. Watkins:

Widely known as the author of an Aug. 15 memo to former Enron chairman Kenneth L. Lay warning that Enron would "implode in a wave of accounting scandals," she told the committee she believed Mr. Lay "did not understand the gravity of the situation the company was in." Even after she explained to him in detail the company's questionable accounting practices and huge hidden losses, she said, Mr. Lay still "didn't get it."

"He seemed to take it very seriously," Ms. Watkins testified. When Mr. Lay got to the point in her memo where she quoted other executives calling the company "crooked," Mr. Lay "winced," she said. "That seemed a painful comment to him."

The same editorial quoted above is less tender:

Ms. Watkins's testimony provided some solace to Mr. Lay, who two days earlier invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at a Senate hearing after a volley of critical statements by committee members comparing him to Charles Ponzi and a carnival barker.

There is much Mr. Lay he will have to explain before we can buy Ms. Watkins's portrayal of him as an executive betrayed by clever underlings. The record belies that portrait, including Enron's sweetheart deals with Lay family members, Mr. Lay's misleading exhortations to employees to buy the company stock last August and September, and the meaningless review he conducted of Ms. Watkins's allegations.

Ms. Watkins was least convincing when asked why she hadn't taken her concerns about the company's accounting gimmicks, and possible fraud, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the media or at least to other Enron board members. All she could say was that she did not want to hasten the demise of the corporation. In truth, Enron's only hope for survival was for someone like Ms. Watkins or Jeffrey McMahon, the treasurer who also worried about the company's accounting, to go public with their concerns as early as possible. That would have given this sordid tale a true whistle-blower.